Logging on a user account that is a member of more than 1010 groups may fail on a Windows Server-based computer
Event Type: Warning
Event Source: LsaSrv
Event Category: None
Event ID: 6035
During a logon attempt, the user's security context accumulated too many security IDs. This is a very unusual situation. Remove the user from some global or local groups to reduce the number of security IDs to incorporate into the security context.
User's SID is SID
If this is the Administrator account, logging on in safe mode will enable Administrator to log on by automatically restricting group memberships.
The array that contains the SIDs of the user’s group memberships in the access token can contain no more than 1024 SIDs. The LSA cannot drop any SID from the token. So, if there are more SIDs, the LSA fails to create the access token and the user will be unable to log on.
When the list of SIDs is built, the LSA also inserts several generic, well-known SIDs in addition to the SIDs for the user’s group memberships (evaluated transitively). Thus if a user is a member of more than about 1,010 custom security groups, the total number of SIDs can exceed the 1,024 SID limit.
- Tokens for both administrator and non-administrator accounts are subject to the limit.
- The exact number of custom SIDs varies with the logon type (For example, interactive, service, network) and operating system version of the domain controller and computer that creates the token.
- Using Kerberos or NTLM as the authentication protocol has no bearing on access token limit.
- The Kerberos client setting "MaxTokenSize" is discussed in KB 327825. "Token" in the Kerberos Context refers to the buffer for the tickets received by a Windows Kerberos host. Depending on the size of the ticket, the type of SIDs and whether SID compression is enabled, the buffer can hold fewer or many more SIDs than that would fit into the access token.
- The primary SIDs of the user/computer and the security groups the account is member of.
- The SIDs in the SIDHistory attribute of the groups in scope of the logon.
- The user is from a trusted domain where SIDHistory and SIDs are filtered out.
- The user is from a trusted domain across a trust where SIDs are quarantined. Then, only SIDs from the same domain as the user's are included.
- Only the Domain Local Group SIDs from the domain of the resource are included.
- Only the Server Local Group SIDs from the resource server are included.
Method 1This resolution applies to the situation in which the user who encounters the logon error is not an administrator, and administrators can successfully log on to the computer or to the domain.
This resolution must be performed by an administrator who has permissions to change the group memberships that the affected user is a member of. The administrator must change the user’s group memberships to make sure that the user is no longer a member of more than about 1010 security groups (considering the transitive group memberships and the local group memberships).
Options to reduce the number of SIDs in the user token include the following:
- Remove the user from a sufficient number of security groups.
- Convert unused security groups to distribution groups. Distribution groups don’t count against the access token limit. Distribution groups can be converted back to security groups when a converted group is required.
- Determine whether security principals are relying on SID History for resource access. If not, remove the SIDHistory attribute from these accounts. You can retrieve the attribute value through an authoritative restore.
Method 2The resolution applies to the situation in which administrator account cannot log on to the computer.
When the user whose logon fails because of too many group memberships is a member of the Administrators group, an administrator who has the credentials for the Administrator account (that is, an account that has a well-known relative identifier [RID] of 500) must restart a domain controller by selecting the Safe Mode startup option (or by selecting the Safe Mode with Networking startup option). In safe mode, he must then log on to the domain controller by using this Administrator account credentials.
Microsoft has changed the token generation algorithm so that the LSA can create an access token for the Administrator account so that the administrator can log on regardless of how many transitive groups or intransitive groups that the Administrator account is a member of. When one of these safe mode startup options is used, the access-token that is created for the Administrator account includes the SIDs of all Built-in and all Domain Global groups that the Administrator account is a member of.
These groups typically include the following:
- Everyone (S-1-1-0)
- BUILTIN\Users (S-1-5-32-545)
- BUILTIN\Administrators (S-1-5-32-544)
- NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE (S-1-5-4)
- NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users (S-1-5-11)
- LOCAL (S-1-2-0)
- Domain\Domain Users (S-1-5-21-xxxxxxxx-yyyyyyyy-zzzzzzzz-513)
- Domain\Domain Admins (S-1-5-21-xxxxxxxx-yyyyyyyy-zzzzzzzz-512)
- BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access(S-1-5-32-554) if Everyone is a member of this group
- NT AUTHORITY\This Organization (S-1-5-15) if the domain controller is running Windows Server 2003
After an administrator has logged on by selecting one of the safe mode startup options and by using the credentials of the Administrator account, the administrator must then identify and modify the membership of the security groups that caused the denial of logon service.
After this change is made, users should be able to log on successfully after a time period that is equal to the domain’s replication latency has elapsed.
|NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users (S-1-5-11)|
|Logon Session Sid (S-1-5-5-X-Y)|
Examples for SIDs depending on logon session type:
|CONSOLE LOGON (S-1-2-1)|
|NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK (S-1-5-2)|
|NT AUTHORITY\SERVICE (S-1-5-6)|
|NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE (S-1-5-4)|
|NT AUTHORITY\TERMINAL SERVER USER (S-1-5-13)|
|NT AUTHORITY\BATCH (S-1-5-3)|
|Domain \Domain Computers (S-1-5-21-xxxxxxxx-yyyyyyyy-zzzzzzzz-515)|
|Domain \Domain Users (S-1-5-21-xxxxxxxx-yyyyyyyy-zzzzzzzz-513)|
|Domain \Domain Admins (S-1-5-21-xxxxxxxx-yyyyyyyy-zzzzzzzz-512)|
|Authentication authority asserted identity (S-1-18-1)|
|Service asserted identity (S-1-18-2)|
|Medium Mandatory Level (S-1-16-8192)|
|High Mandatory Level (S-1-16-12288)|
|BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access(S-1-5-32-554) if Everyone is a member of this group|
|NT AUTHORITY\This Organization (S-1-5-15) if the account is from the same forest as the computer.|
- As you can see with the note at SID entry “Logon Session SID”, do not count the SIDs in the list of tool outputs and assume that they are complete for all target computers and logon types. You should consider an account is in danger of running into this limit when it has more than 1000 SIDs. Don’t forget that, depending on the computer where a token is created, server or workstation local groups can also be added.
- xxxxxxxx-yyyyyyyy-zzzzzzzz indicates the domain or workstation components of the SID.
In this example, assume that Joe belongs to Domain A and is a member of a domain local group Domain A\Chicago Users. Joe is also a member of a domain local group Domain B\Chicago Users. When Joe logs on to a computer that belongs to Domain A (for example, Domain A\Workstation1), a token is generated for Joe on the computer, and the token contains, in addition to all the universal and global group memberships, the SID for Domain A\Chicago Users. It will not contain the SID for Domain B\Chicago Users because the computer where Joe logged on (Domain A\Workstation1) belongs to Domain A.
Similarly, when Joe logs on to a computer that belongs to Domain B (for example, Domain B\Workstation1), a token is generated for Joe on the computer, and the token contains, in addition to all the universal and global group memberships, the SID for Domain B\Chicago Users; it will not contain the SID for Domain A\Chicago Users because the computer where Joe logged on (Domain B\Workstation1) belongs to Domain B.
However, when Joe logs on to a computer that belongs to Domain C (for example, Domain C\Workstation1), a token is generated for Joe on the logon computer that contains all universal and global group memberships for Joe's user account. Neither the SID for Domain A\Chicago Users nor the SID for Domain B\Chicago Users appears in the token because the domain local groups that Joe is a member of are in a different domain than the computer where Joe logged on (Domain C\Workstation1). Conversely, if Joe were a member of some domain local group that belongs to Domain C (for example, Domain C\Chicago Users), the token that is generated for Joe on the computer would contain, in addition to all the universal and global group memberships, the SID for Domain C\Chicago Users.
Artikelnummer: 328889 – Letzte Überarbeitung: 06/20/2016 06:59:00 – Revision: 5.0
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